ChinaWatch: Meet number one rockstar monk

He was an introverted child who was drawn to Buddhism. At 16, Shi Daoxin entered a Buddhist monastery, remaining an anonymous monk until 2008 when China’s netizens discovered a photo of him posted on his blog. In the photo Shi Daoxin is posing on a rocky hill surrounded by bare shrubs; his brown monk robes highlighting the sunglasses and mobile phone earpiece that cling to his face. The blog entry title blatantly emphasised his likeness to Hong Kong acting and singing star Nicholas Tse.

Shi Daoxin took advantage of the ensuing public interest and launched a career as a minor celebrity. But with celebrity comes scrutiny.

One blogger accused Shi Daoxin of “ruining China’s Buddhist culture, tarnishing Buddha’s radiant image, polluting the internet’s generally favourable atmosphere and corrupting the media’s professional integrity”. Despite doubts of his authenticity and sincerity, he remains in the public eye, dispersing wisdom and pouting piously.

Savvy use of social media, regular appearances on television.Including imparting Buddhist-flavoured guidance to participants on the reality dating show “Hot Summer Days”. And an album of saccharine songs entreating Buddha’s help have seen his star rise. Normally monks only wear the robes of the temple or lineage to which they belong. Not Shi Daoxin, who has proved adept at matching his range of robes with strikingly coloured pairs of thick-framed glasses.

For all the destruction wrought on religion by the atheist arguments of socialism and rampant iconoclasm of high-Maoism—religion has remained an important part of Chinese society. Since its introduction to China in the 1st century CE, Buddhism has been the religion of the masses in China.

China has five state-sanctioned religions – Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, “Patriotic Catholicism” and Protestantism. Beyond these “official religions” lie a plethora of local deities, new religions (including the banned Falun Gong, called an “evil cult”) and underground and semi-underground Christian ‘house churches’ that serve China’s estimated 25-100 million Christians. There is now even a market for new age paraphernalia such as crystals and dream-catchers. By and large, unofficial religions are tolerated as long as they do not threaten the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or its rule.

The CCP today sees religion as a potential tool in the creation of a “harmonious society”. In the three decades since China began the process of reforming social and cultural institutions, religion—in its many and varied forms—has changed markedly, often due to the influence of the state.

The benchmark case is the “qigong boom” of the 1980s and 1990s, when an estimated 60-200 million people practiced some form of mind, body and breathing exercises designed to, among various things, improve health and longevity. 

Practitioners (including some CCP officials) were able to take control of their health instead of relying on public health facilities, to which access was not equitable or even guaranteed. Qigong was tolerated by the CCP until it was deemed to be a threat to the state – partly due to the charismatic nature of the leading practitioners – and banned. Falun Gong emerged from the qigong movement.

In 1999 the CCP panicked and cracked down on the group when 10,000 practitioners unexpectedly appeared outside the central government compound to protest against media attacks. Claiming 3,000 dead, 6,000 imprisoned and 100,000 in labour camps as a result of the CCP campaign, Falun Gong’s sustained and sophisticated global campaign against these human rights abuses and the destruction of Chinese culture has been terrible PR for the CCP. This battle is ongoing.

Notable examples of the tension between the CCP and religious groups in the last year include the eviction of a large Protestant house-church in Beijing and a ‘self-immolation spree’ by Tibetan monks protesting Chinese rule in the disputed areas of the Tibetan plateau. In the far western province of Xinjiang, the CCP recently claimed that seven kidnappers shot dead by authorities were part of a “holy war”, based on suspected connections between some in the local Muslim Uighur population and Pakistani militants.

The conflict in Tibetan areas and Xinjiang is not simply a religious one. Geo-political issues are also important as local communities often dispute the legitimacy and processes of Chinese rule. Of course, these controversial examples do not typify the religious environment in contemporary China. To avoid conflict with the state, certain religious organisations and individuals conduct public services such as education, health, counselling and disaster relief in a secular manner. 

Shi Daoxin helps gameshow contestants get a hot date and enlightenment! While not necessarily covert or clandestine, cloaking religious activities in cultural, educational or social clothing is a pragmatic concession by religious groups that if they play by the CCP’s rules, then they can survive. Claiming to uphold cultural values is one way that certain religious groups (especially Buddhist and Daoist ones) can act out their beliefs.

Shi Daoxin has announced plans to publish a book elaborating his contemporary take on Buddhism. I hope it includes his reflections on Monkey Magic. No doubt he will market it heavily through the mind-boggling array of online channels. And as long as he sticks to pushing his own image and not pushing over the CCP, then his garish glasses and reverb-soaked Buddhist ditties will continue to pop up in the news feeds of China’s netizens.

That is, until someone even more of “this generation” - cloaked in newer robes and offering an even more appealing spiritual solution - starts to surf the digital wave.

ChinaWatch is a monthly series on what’s happening in China from a political, social, environmental, music and arts perspective. If you’d like to contribute to the series, know of some great links, websites, magazines, contacts or just harbor a passion for China, feel free to drop me a line: lucy@thepunch.com.au